Our research aims at providing an alternative model of agent communication to the one proposed by the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA). We adopt the mainstream perspective that views agent communication as the performance of communicative acts, but we shift the focus from agents' mental states to their social state. Starting from the FIPA Communicative Act Library, we provide a commitment-based semantics for a significant set of acts. This analysis leads to a classification of such acts that is to shed some light on topics that have not been dealt with in an effective way yet.
Introduction
Our research aims at providing an alternative model of agent communication to the one proposed by the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents [3] , which shows some shortcomings that, in our opinion, prevent this proposal from being universally accepted. We share the speech-act-based view of communication that has been mainstream in this context since Cohen and Perrault's work ( [1] , [2] , [12] ), and that has been adopted also by FIPA, but we define speech acts in terms of commitments between agents rather than agents' mental states. We have already tried to show in [16] how several issues rise from expressing the messages' semantics in terms of mental states and how such problems can be effectively tackled by relying on commitments instead. One way to prove that our proposal can be considered as an effective alternative to FIPA's mentalistic approach is to provide a commitment-based semantics for a significant set of acts taken from FIPA's Communicative Act Library [4] .
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 illustrates our view of communication as a process defined within the context of an artificial institution; Section 3 provides the technical details of our logical model of communication; Section 4 analyzes our concept of commitment, which enables us to define all communicative acts in Section 5; we focus on a specific act to show the advantages of our approach in Section 6; finally, we draw our conclusions and show our future research paths in Section 7.
Communication as an institutional action
In our approach, events are reified, that is, they are treated as a kind of individuals, namely event tokens. Every event token belongs to (at least) an event type. Event tokens take place at a certain instant. Should we deal with a phenomenon that occurs over a time-interval, we take into account only the event corresponding to its completion. We view an action as an event brought about by an agent. We write Done(e, a, t) to say that event (or action) e of type t has been brought about by agent a. In this research context, we focus our attention on three different classes of action types: message exchanges, communicative acts, and commitment manipulations. We view the first action type as physical, while the last two as institutional. An institutional action is defined within the context of an artificial institution, that is, a set of shared rules that regulate the management of a fragment of social reality (e.g. multi-agent systems) [11, 7] . An agent performs an institutional action by executing some lower level act that conventionally counts as the performance of the institutional action, provided that some specific conditions hold. Our proposal deals with the definition of an artificial institution of commitmentbased communication. These action type classes reflect our view on agent communication, which is embodied by a three-level model, as follows.
(i) As we give commitments a central role in the definition of the semantics of agent communication, at the top level of our model we put the basic institutional actions, which, in our approach, are commitment manipulations (e.g.: an mc act is defined as creating a commitment of the speaker towards the hearer to the truth of some specific content). Other works in the literature focus on agents' mental states at this level [17] .
(ii) Some combinations of commitment manipulation actions are particularly frequent and significant for agent interaction. Thus, it is natural to categorize them and single them out as communicative acts of a certain type, provided that some specific conditions hold (e.g.: an inform act is defined as an mc act). This level relates to the communicative act libraries of other proposals [4] .
(iii) The last level deals with the syntactical aspects of an agent communication framework, in that it illustrates how communicative acts are concretely performed by means of message exchange acts that conventionally count as communicative acts (e.g.: the inform message exchange counts as an inform communicative act). In this work we follow a conventional system for the sake of example, but any well defined syntax can be used, provided that it is properly related to the upper level.
We consider message exchange acts as physical for the sake of simplicity. They are actually institutional, like communicative acts and commitment manipulations. Only, the relevant institutions are different: we should take into account the conventions that map electric signals onto zeros (0) and ones (1) and also the ASCII codes that map bit strings onto characters, which is out of the scope of this paper. We use the tt typeface for physical act types of message exchange, and the emph typeface for communicative acts and commitment manipulations, which are institutional.
Our model is comprised of a number of axioms that formalize the performance of the communicative acts. We write CountsAs(x, t, t ) to say that the performance by agent x of an act of type t counts as the performance of an act of type t according to our institution. For every pair of communicative act type t and relevant message type t, we have an axiom like the following:
where Ψ x,t,t represents a set of conditions that must hold so that the message exchange counts as the communicative act. In turn, the communicative act is defined in terms of a commitment manipulation action, as below:
Done(e, x, t) = def Done(e, x, t ).
The performance by agent x of an act e of type t is defined as the performance of an act of type t'.
Let us reprise the inform act as an example. There are no conditions to meet so that an inform message counts as an inform communicative act, so we have that Ψ x,inform,inform is always true. These message exchange and communicative act types are parametric with respect to the addressee and the content, so that we have:
By ref(y) we mean that in a proper field of the message there is a reference to agent y in accordance to the syntactic rules of the adopted language. In our commitment-based semantics, informing is defined as becoming committed to the truth of what is stated, so an inform(y, s) communicative act by agent x is defined as making a commitment with x as debtor, y as creditor, and s as content, as below: Done(e, x, inform(y, s)) = def Done(e, x, mc(x, y, s)).
The mc act has also x as a parameter for future extension of our model, in which we would like to enable other agents to create a commitment in which x is the debtor. Before providing the detailed definition of the other acts, we first need to illustrate our model in a formal way.
The model
Our starting point is CTL ± [16] , a temporal logic including both futuredirected and past-directed temporal operators. Our model of time is branching in the future to take different possible evolutions of the system into account, and linear in the past, to ensure historical necessity [13] .
The syntax

A CTL
± language is a sextuple Σ, V, C, Ξ, Π, θ , where Σ is a nonempty set of sorts, V is a denumerable set of (individual) variables, C is an arbitrary set of (individual) constants, Ξ is an arbitrary set of functors, Π is an arbitrary set of predicates, and θ is a function that assigns a sort to every variable and every constant, and a prototype (i.e. a possibly empty sort sequence) to every functor and every predicate. We assume set V to include denumerable many variables for every sort in Σ.
For every sort σ, we define the set T σ of terms of sort σ as follows:
• x ∈ T σ if x ∈ V and θ(x) = σ;
• a ∈ T σ if a ∈ C and θ(a) = σ;
• f (t 1 , ..., t n ) ∈ T σ if f ∈ Ξ and θ(f ) = σ, θ(t 1 ), ..., θ(t n ) ;
• nothing else belongs to T σ .
The set A of atomic formulae is such that:
• P (t 1 , ..., t n ) ∈ A if P ∈ Π, θ(P ) = σ 1 , ..., σ n and t i ∈ T σ i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
• nothing else belongs to A.
The set Φ of CTL ± formulae is defined as follows:
• A ⊆ Φ;
• ¬φ ∈ Φ if φ ∈ Φ;
• ∀xφ ∈ Φ if x ∈ V and φ ∈ Φ;
• Nextφ, Preφ ∈ Φ if φ ∈ Φ;
• Aφ if φ ∈ Φ;
• nothing else belongs to Φ.
The temporal operators Next (at the next state), Pre (at the previous state), Until, Since, and A (on all paths), are primitive. The formulae true, false, (φ ∨ ψ), (φ → ψ), (φ ↔ ψ), and ∃xφ are abbreviations defined as usual in terms of the formulae above. As usual, φ[t/x] denotes the result of replacing all free occurrences of variable x in φ with term t. Formula Eφ abbreviates ¬A¬φ. We also introduce these temporal operators, SomeFut (sometimes in the future), SomePast (sometimes in the past), AlwFut (always in the future), AlwPast (always in the past), Some (sometimes), and Alw (always) as abbreviations, whose definitions can be found in [15] .
The semantics
A CTL
± frame is a structure F = S, π , where S is a set of states, and π : S → S is an injective function that associates to every state a unique predecessor. Function π is such that every state is the predecessor of at least one state. A path in F is an infinite sequence p = p 0 , ..., p n , ... of states, in which every element p n of the sequence is the predecessor of p n+1 in F . The subsequence of p starting from element p n is itself a path, which we denote with p n ; for every n > 0, we say that p n is a subpath of p.
F is a CTL ± frame, D is a multidomain, and i is an interpretation function assigning:
• an individual i(c) ∈ D θ(c) to every constant c;
f such that θ(f ) = σ, σ 1 , ..., σ n ;
• a relation i(s, P ) ⊆ D σ 1 × ... × D σn to every state s and every predicate P such that θ(P ) = σ 1 , ..., σ n .
An assignment of individuals to variables is a function
The denotation of term t under an assignment v is defined as follows:
Denotations do not depend on paths, so that constants are rigid. Let us define the conditions under which a formula is true in model M on path p under assignment v:
for some path q and for some n, q n = p and M, q |= ψ and for all m s.
Let us now show how to deal with commitments in our model.
Commitments and their manipulation
We need to introduce the relevant sorts in our language to define a logic of commitments. We assume that the set Σ of CTL ± sorts contains at least the elements event (the sort of events), agent (the sort of agents), eventtype (the sort of event types), and sentence (the sort of content language sentences), and that the set P of predicates contains at least the elements Happ, Actor, T ype, Comm, and P rec. To indicate that predicate Happ's prototype is θ(Happ) = event , we write Happ(event), and we use a similar notation for the other predicates:
• Actor(event,agent);
• T ype(event,eventtype);
• Comm(event,agent,agent,sentence);
• P rec(event,agent,agent,sentence).
Intuitively, Happ(e) means that event e has just happened, Actor(e, x) means that event e, if it happened at all, has been brought about by agent x (we also say that x is the actor of e), and T ype(e, t) means that e is an event of type t. We assume that an event cannot happen more than once on the same path. This assumption is captured by the following event uniqueness axiom:
(EU) Happ(e) →PreAlwPast¬Happ(e)∧ANextAlwFut¬Happ(e). Now we are able to formally define the Done predicate that we have introduced before:
(DD) Done(e, x, t) = def Happ(e) ∧ Actor(e, x) ∧ T ype(e, t).
Let us introduce the Comm predicate: to say that a commitment holds at a state in which agent x (the debtor) is bound, relative to agent y (the creditor), to the fact that some proposition (the content) is true, we write M, p, v |= Comm(e, x, y, s).
The first argument of the Comm predicate, e, is the event that has brought about the state of affairs in which the commitment holds. The content of the commitment is a formula of a content language represented as a firstorder term s of sort sentence. The semantics of CL sentences is provided by translating them into formulae of Φ. We define a function : D sentence → Φ such that, given a sentence term s, s is the Φ formula it corresponds to. We also introduce a function : Φ → D sentence which, given a formula φ ∈ Φ, returns the relevant term φ ∈ D sentence .
Commitments that have been proposed but not yet accepted nor rejected are defined as precommitments. They are represented in the same way as commitments:
M, p, v |= P rec(e, x, y, s).
We have already said that, in our approach, message exchanges under specific conditions count as communicative acts, which are defined in terms of commitment manipulation actions. Thus, the set D eventtype must contain all the types for both communicative acts and commitment manipulations. Let us first focus on the latter. D eventtype includes the following parametric event types, corresponding to five basic actions for manipulating commitments:
(i) make-commitment: mc(x, y, s);
(ii) make-precommitment: mp(x, y, s);
(iii) cancel-commitment: cc(e, x, y, s);
(iv) cancel-precommitment: cp(e, x, y, s);
(v) accept-precommitment: ap(e, x, y, s).
The mc and mp event types have three parameters, x, y, and s, that correspond to the debtor, the creditor, and the content of the (pre)commitment that is being created. The cc, cp, and ap event types have one more parameter e, that refers to the event that has brought about the (pre)commitment that is being cancelled or accepted.
Here are the axioms that describe the above mentioned types of commitment manipulation actions in terms of their effects. We may use the 'm-dash' character to express existential quantification.
These axioms feature the Z temporal operator, which represents the intuitive concept of "until and no longer", and is defined as follows:
φ Z ψ is true if and only if in the future ψ never becomes true and φ is always true, or φ is true until ψ eventually becomes true and since then φ is no longer true.
(MC) Done(e, −, mc(x, y, s)) → A (Comm(e, x, y, s) Z Done(−, −, cc(e, x, y, s))); (MP) Done(e, −, mp(x, y, s)) → A (P rec(e, x, y, s) Z (Done(−, −, ap(e, x, y, s))∨ Done(−, −, cp(e, x, y, s)))); (AP) Done(e , −, ap(e, x, y, s)) → A(Comm(e , x, y, s) Z Done(−, −, cc(e , x, y, s))).
Axiom MC (Make Commitment) states that if an agent (not necessarily x or y) performs an action of making a commitment with x as the debtor, y as the creditor, and s as the content, then on all paths x is committed, relative to y, to the truth of s, until an agent possibly cancels such a commitment, after which the commitment no longer exists. Axiom MP (Make Precommitment) is analogous to MC, and it deals with the creation of a precommitment. Axiom AP (Accept Precommitment) entails that if an agent performs the action of accepting a precommitment brought about by event e with x, y, and s respectively as debtor, creditor, and content, then such acceptance brings about on all paths a commitment of x, relative to y, to the truth of s, which will hold until it is possibly cancelled. There are no specific axioms for the actions of cancelling a precommitment (cp) or a commitment (cc), because the analytical effects of these commitment manipulations are already illustrated in the axioms dealing with other actions.
Commitments are said to be fulfilled and violated when their content is settled true and false, respectively. We must take into account the contingent future phenomenon due to our branching model of time. At a certain state, it may be still undetermined if a sentence is going to be true or false. In such a case, a formula is said to be unsettled, and the relevant commitment is pending.
The truth conditions of CL sentences are thus formalized as follows:
(DT) T rue(e, s) = def ASomePast(Happ(e) ∧ s ), (DF) F alse(e, s) = def ASomePast(Happ(e) ∧ ¬ s ), (DU) Unset(e, s) = def ASomePastHapp(e)∧ ¬T rue(e, s) ∧ ¬F alse(e, s).
The truth conditions of sentence s are given with respect to an event e, which does not necessarily correspond to the event of uttering s. Event e is used to set a well-defined temporal reference by which we can evaluate the truth of s getting rid of all the indexicals [10] . All these definitions rely on the event uniqueness axiom EU. We then have the following definitions:
(DL) F ulf(e, x, y, s) = def Comm(e, x, y, s) ∧ T rue(e, s), (DV)V iol(e, x, y, s)= def Comm(e, x, y, s) ∧ F alse(e, s), (DP) P end(e, x, y, s) = def Comm(e, x, y, s) ∧ Unset(e, s).
Let us now show how communicative acts map onto the above-mentioned commitment manipulation acts.
Communicative act types
Each communicative act type that we model can be found in the FIPA Communicative Act Library [4] . We suppose that D eventtype includes the following communicative act types: inform, request, agree, propose, accept-proposal, refuse, reject-proposal, cancel, request-when, request-whenever, inform-if, queryif, inform-ref, query-ref, propagate, proxy. We can classify these communicative acts depending on the way they relate to commitment manipulation acts and to message exchange act, as follows: basic acts are mapped one-to-one both onto message types and onto commitment manipulation act types; for instance, the inform act is defined as creating a commitment, that is, performing a mc (make-commitment) act, and to achieve this, an agent must exchange a proper inform message; macro acts are defined in terms of one or more other communicative acts, so that they are mapped onto a set of commitment manipulation acts; those acts that are defined in terms of another single act, like request-when, which can be seen as a request with a specific content, can be executed by an agent in the form of the basic act they boil down to; thus, strictly speaking, even though it is part of the FIPA Communicative Act Library, the relevant message type is not necessary; instead, the relevant message type is necessary for those macro acts that are defined in terms of more than one other communicative acts, like propagate, which is parametric with respect to a communicative act t, and is defined as the performance of such act and the request to perform act t to a selected group of agents; abstract acts are defined as a logical combination of communicative acts that cannot correspond to a specific message type, like the inform-if act, which is defined as informing that some state of affairs holds, or that it does not hold: there does not exist an inform-if message that an agent can send to inform that a state of affairs holds or not, an agent will always use an inform message with a proper content.
A more detailed analysis of these acts follows.
Basic communicative acts
In our approach, we call basic those communicative acts that map directly onto a commitment manipulation action and that are performed by agent by means of the relevant message exchange, given that some conditions hold. For every kind of communicative act we introduce a functor that specifies the type of the action that an agent performs. Suppose that a message is sent to agent y to inform y that s is the case. The exchange of such a message is an event Done(e, x, t) = def Done(e, x, t')
agree(y, (e, x, y, s)) ap(e, x, y, s)
propose(y, s) mp(x, y, s)
accept-proposal (y, (e, y, x, s)) ap(e, y, x, s) refuse(y, (e, x, y, s)) cp(e, x, y, s)
reject-proposal (y, (e, y, x, s)) cp(e, y, x, s)
cancel (y, (e, y, x, s)) cc(e, y, x, s) (y), s) ).
This event, under given conditions which we illustrate later on, implies the performance of the relevant communicative act inform(y,s), whose semantics, in turn, is defined in terms of a change in the network of commitments binding the sender and the receiver, as illustrated in Table 1 . The correspondence between the message exchange and the commitment manipulation relies on a relation that is formally described by the formula below, CountsAs(x, t, t), which means that an action of type t performed by agent x corresponds to an action of type t in accordance to a convention established by the artificial institution regulating the communication framework.
We have a message exchange type for each basic communicative act. Here we illustrate the conditions that must hold to make a message exchange count as a communicative act. These conditions deal with the agent designated to perform an action (e.g., if x makes a request to y, y must be the performer of the requested action, y = agent(s) in symbols), with the creators of precommitments (e.g., if x accepts a proposal by exchanging a message with y, y must be the issuer of such proposal, Actor(e, y)), and with some presuppositions about the existence of precommitments (i.e., x cannot reject a proposal that has not been made). This is formally stated by the following axiom schemata: Ψ x,t,t → CountsAs(x, t, t) (CO) Done(e, x, t)∧CountsAs(x, t, t) → Done(e, x, t),
where Ψ x,t,t is to be understood as the conjunction of the formulae indicated in the second column of Table 2 for each message type. A comparison between our approach and another work dealing with the notion of convention [8] can be found in [16] .
Macro communicative acts
Macro communicative acts are defined in terms of one or more communicative acts. Before dealing with some of these acts, we have to introduce our formalism to represent action expressions.
Action expressions
So far, we have treated commitments with a generic content term s, but now we have the need for more specific contents, dealing with future actions performed by agents. Let us first introduce some derived temporal operators allowing for more synthetic formulae:
Formula φ AsSoonAs ψ holds when φ is true as soon as ψ is (possibly) true. We define a subdomain D action ⊆ D sentence of action expressions. We have identified two action expression schemata, which are expressive enough to allow for a vast range of formulae dealing with action performances. Let d, s λ , s ω , and s χ be terms of D sentence . We define the first action expression schema α ∀ as follows:
We have M, p, v |= α ∀ if and only if in the sequence of states on path p which begins at the first occurrence of s λ and ends at the subsequent state at which s ω is the case, every time s χ holds, then d is true. The notation with square brackets has already been adopted in [14] , and it was originally inspired by [9] . We define the other action expression schema, α ∃ , as follows:
Actor(e, y)
Pre P rec(e, x, y, s)
, (e, y, x, s)) Actor(e, y)
Pre P rec(e, y, x, s)
, (e, x, y, s)) Actor(e, y)
Pre Comm(e, y, x, s) Table 2 Conditions that make a message exchange count as a communicative act
AsSoonAs s λ .
α ∀ and α ∃ are roughly based on the ideas of universal and existential quantification, respectively. We will refer to a generic action expression, whether universal or existential, by α. In our model, the request-when and request-whenever acts are viewed as request acts comprised of specific action expressions, and are formally defined as follows:
request-when(y, t 1 , s 1 ) = def request(y, α 1 ), α 1 = true , s 1 |s 1 Done(−, y, t 1 ) ; request-whenever (y, t 2 , s 2 ) = def request(y, α 2 ), α 2 = [ true , f alse |s 2 ] Done(−, y, t 2 ) .
As we have that true , s 1 |s 1 Done(−, y,t 1 ) ↔ Done(−, y, t 1 ) AsSoonAs s 1 , by performing a communicative act of type request-when(y,t 1 , s 1 ), an agent requests y to perform an act of type t 1 as soon as s 1 holds. Similarly, as we have
a request-whenever(y,t 2 ,s 2 ) act consists of a request to y to perform a t 2 action every time s 2 is the case. The definitions of some other macro acts are relying on referential operators, which are illustrated in the following.
Referential operators
Inspired by FIPA's specifications [6] , we introduce three referential operators, any, the, and all, to create referential terms like (any x f), (the x f), and (all x f) (with f ∈ D sentence ) which are to be read as "any x", "the x", and "all the x" such that f is true . We assume that there exists a sort URI of uniform resource identifiers, which identify every object in multidomain D with a unique name, and a function uri : D → D URI that returns the URI of every element in D. URIs are assumed to be self-referential. Given a referential term r, we define the inform-ref act as a specialization of an inform act, as follows:
where s r corresponds to a specific formula in accordance with r, as follows: Done(e, x,query-ref (y, r)) = def Done(e, x,request(y, α)), α = SomeFutDone (−, y,inform-ref (x, r) ) .
Another communicative act relying on the referential operators is propagate, by means of which an agent performs a communicative act to another agent, and requests it to forward the act to a group of agents. Such group is determined by a referential expression embedded in the propagate message, that is, the group is comprised of any/the/all the agents that satisfy a certain property.
To formalize this act, we need to extend the substitution operator [-/-] also to terms, in particular to terms denoting action types, which, in turn, include terms denoting agents. For instance, we have that if t = inform(y, s), then t[z/y] = inform(z, s).
We define a propagate act as follows: A proxy act is only comprised of the request component of a propagate act:
Done(e, x, proxy(y, c, r)) = def Done(e, x, request(y, s r )), where s r is defined as above.
The query-if act is defined as a request for an inform-if act, which is illustrated in the following section:
Done(e, x, query-if(y, s)) = def Done(e, x, request(y, α)), where α = SomFutDone(−, y, inform-if(x, s)).
All macro acts, except for propagate, are defined in terms of a single basic act with a specific content. Thus, agents can perform these acts by exchanging the messages that correspond to the basic communicative acts the macro acts boil down to. For instance, as a request-when(y, p, q) act is defined as a request(y, s) act with s = true , p |p Done(−, y, q) , exchanging a request(ref(y), s) message will do.
A propagate act is different in that it is defined as the performance of a communicative act c and of a request to propagate such act. It is important to stress that these two sub-tasks are achieved by means of one act, not two. Thus, a propagate message is necessary as a physical counterpart of this event token that belongs to two different communicative act types at the same time. To specify the conditions by which a propagate message exchange counts as a propagate communicative act, let us introduce a dest function that, given a communicative act type, returns the addressee of such act: if t = inform(y, s), then dest(t) = y.
We then have that Done(e, x,propagate(ref(y), c, r)) ∧ Ψ x,propagate,propagate → Done(e, x, propagate(y, c, r)), where Ψ x,propagate,propagate ≡ dest(c) = y.
In many of the examples above, the content of request acts include a simple temporal operator SomeFut, which means that the requested acts can be performed at some unspecified future instant. We remind that SomeFutφ is equivalent to the following temporal qualification:
true , false | true φ, which can be specified to introduce the needed deadlines. This topic is illustrated in detail in [14] .
Abstract communicative acts
This section is comprised of only one act: inform-if. Following the FIPA specifications, we define the inform-if act as informing whether a sentence is true or not, that is, as a disjunction of mutually exclusive inform acts, as follows.
Done(e, x,inform-if (y, s)) = def Done(e, x,inform(y, s)) ∨ Done(e, x,inform(y, ¬ s )), where φ ∨ ψ = def (φ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬(φ ∧ ψ). The inform-if is an abstract act because there cannot be an inform-if message that an agent could send to inform that s is the case, or it is not: such sent message will always be an inform message, with a positive or a negative content, respectively. This is different from stating that to achieve a macro act like request-when an agent may choose between sending a request-when message and exchanging a request message with a specific content.
In our analysis, we have ruled out those acts, like confirm and disconfirm, whose definition is strictly based on agents' mental states, which are not taken into account in our approach. Failure and not-understood are two acts that deal with attempts and message decoding, which are concepts that lie beyond the scope of this work.
Focusing on a public and objective concept like commitment allows us to know at every instant of an interaction the deontic positions of the involved agents, and thus prove significant properties of interaction protocols, as in the following detailed analysis of the CFP (call for proposal) act.
The Call For Proposal act
Following the FIPA guidelines, a cfp act is defined as a query-ref act with a specific content, in our model, too, as below:
Done(e, x,cfp(y, τ )) = def Done(e, x,query-ref (y,any w α)), α = Done(−, x,pay(y, w)) , Deadline | true Done(−, y, τ) .
When performing a cfp act, agent x asks agent y the sum w that x has to pay to y to have service τ done by y before a certain deadline (the Done(−, x,pay(y, w)) formula can be easily generalized or adapted to different application domains).
Here we analyze the evolution of the commitments between agents x and y when, on a path p of a model M under an assignment v, x performs a cfp act to y:
1. M, p, v |= Done(e, x,cfp(y, τ )) (hypothesis) 2. M, p, v |= Done(e, x,query-ref (y,any w α))
(1, cfp def) 3. M, p, v |= Done(e, x,request(y, α )) (2, query-ref def) 3
• . α = SomeFutDone(−, y,inform-ref (x,any w α)) 4. M, p, v |= Done(e, x, mp(e, y, x, α )).
(3, request def) 5. M, p, v |= P rec(e, y, x, α ) ( 4 , M P )
Thus, a cfp act by x to y creates a precommitment of y towards x to perform an inform-ref act (a deadline for such performance may be specified, if needed).
If y refuses such a precommitment (on a path p that is a subpath of p, ∃n(p = p n )), we have that:
6 . M, p , v |= Done(e , y,refuse(x, (e, y, x, α ))) easier to detect unexpected or unfair behavior.
Conclusions and future work
In this paper we have proposed an alternative to FIPA's mentalistic semantics for Agent Communication Languages. Instead of affecting agents' mental states, in our model every message brings about changes in the social reality that underlies the multi-agent system: precommitments are created, cancelled, turned into commitments throughout the communication process. As commitments are reflect a public and objective state of affairs between agents, we think that our model is more suitable for open multi-agent systems, where we cannot make any assumption about agents' internal architecture (including their mental states). We have provided a commitment-based semantics for a significant set of acts taken from the FIPA Communicative Act Library.
Our future research will focus on issues dealing with referential operators in relation with our concept of commitment. In particular, we are interested in investigating those situations in which there the referential expressions fail, in the sense that they do not refer to any proper set of entities. This problem has already tackled in the field of philosophy of language, and some solutions have been proposed. We would like to see whether some of these solutions can be successfully exploited in the context of our commitment-based model.
